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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Because this appeal is from the final judgment in a 
misdemeanor prosecution, the Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (Supp. 1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Did the trial judge correctly suppress evidence by 
ruling that the arresting officer conducted an illegal search by 
inserting his head into the compartment of a vehicle? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correction of Error. "[T]his court will 
not disturb the trial court's findings of fact unless they are 
clearly erroneous. . . . In reviewing a trial court's conclusions 
of law, however, we apply a correction of error standard." State 
v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah App. 1992); see also State v. 
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Utah 1992); State v. Stewart, 806 P.2d 
213, 215 (Utah App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Constitution amend. IV 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1995) 
RULES 
There are no procedural rules at issue in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal concerns the trial judge's suppression of evidence 
that led to dismissal of a DUI charge against Appellee, Randy 
Burton (Burton). The trial judge held that the arresting officer 
conducted an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution by inserting part of his head into the 
compartment of Appellee's vehicle, and suppressed all evidence 
including field sobriety tests. Without the suppressed evidence, 
the DUI charge was dismissed. The trial judge suppressed the 
evidence based on an incorrect interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
On February 15, 1996, Burton was arrested and charged with 
violating §§ 41-6-44 and 41-6-117 of the Utah Code, driving under 
the influence of alcohol (DUI), and operating an unsafe vehicle. 
Burton was stopped because he was driving late at night without 
2 
headlights. (See Transcript of Hearing on Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress, West Valley City v. Burton, Case no. 96502627 at 
8) (hereinafter "Transcript") . As part of the stop, Officer James 
L. Schmidt ("Schmidt") approached the driver's side window and spoke 
to Burton. From outside of the window, Schmidt detected the odor 
of alcohol on Burton's breath. (Transcript at 12, 14, 27, and 32) . 
Because the officer was taller than the vehicle, he bent over to 
see and hear Burton more clearly. (Transcript at 10-11). Schmidt 
testified that he attempted to lean closer to Burton, and may have 
inserted part of head into the vehicle. (Transcript at 12-13). 
Schmidt ordered Burton out of the car and performed field sobriety 
tests. The tests confirmed that Burton was intoxicated, so Schmidt 
placed him under arrest. 
Burton moved to suppress the field sobriety tests and his 
arrest, on the basis that they were obtained as a result of an 
illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. Burton argued that Schmidt conducted an illegal 
search when he apparently inserted part of his head into the 
vehicle compartment. (Transcript at 26). The court considered 
testimony from Schmidt and also viewed a videotape of the stop.1 
On the videotape, Burton voluntarily admitted that he was drunk. 
The trial judge found that the officer had inserted a portion of 
his head into Burton's vehicle, but also held that the officer had 
a reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was intoxicated 
1
 A video camera was installed in the officer's patrol car, 
and all traffic stops were videotaped. 
3 
prior to inserting his head into the vehicle. The judge ruled that 
the Fourth Amendment prohibited Schmidt from inserting a portion of 
his head into the vehicle, and so he suppressed the evidence. 
(Transcript at 33-34). The exclusion of the evidence prevented 
prosecution of the DUI charge. (Transcript at 38-39). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. THE OFFICER DID NOT CONDUCT AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH, 
BECAUSE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ALLOWS INVESTIGATION 
TO QUICKLY CONFIRM OR DISPEL REASONABLE ARTICULABLE 
SUSPICIONS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 
The officer did not conduct an unreasonable search because his 
reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was intoxicated 
justified further investigation. The trial judge found that 
Officer Schmidt had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton 
was drunk when he detected the odor of alcohol on the outside of 
Burton's vehicle. The trial judge also found that Schmidt had this 
reasonable suspicion before inserting any part of his head into the 
vehicle. This suspicion allowed Schmidt to diligently pursue a 
further investigation which quickly dispelled or confirmed the 
suspicion. Officer Schmidt quickly confirmed that Burton had been 
drinking heavily by smelling his breath. This quickly confirmed 
the officer's suspicions. In addition, smelling Burton's breath 
was within the scope of investigation justified by Schmidt's 
reasonable articulable suspicions. 
II. EVEN IF THE "SEARCH" WAS UNREASONABLE THE OFFICER 
HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONDUCT SOBRIETY TESTS AND 
ARREST BURTON WITHOUT THE INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM 
THE "SEARCH." 
Even if the "search" was unreasonable, the officer still had 
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probable cause to require field sobriety tests and arrest Burton 
based on information obtained independently from the "search." 
Evidence ordinarily subject to the exclusionary rule may be 
admissible if police had a legitimate, independent source for the 
discovery. The trial judge found that Officer Schmidt had a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was intoxicated prior 
to inserting any part of his head into the vehicle. Furthermore, 
Burton voluntarily admitted that he was drunk. This alone gave the 
officer probable cause to require field sobriety tests and arrest 
Burton. The so-called "search" did not affect the admissibility of 
that evidence. 
III. EVEN IF THE "SEARCH" WAS UNREASONABLE UNDER THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT, THE EVIDENCE OF THE FIELD 
SOBRIETY TESTS AND BURTON'S ARREST SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN SUPPRESSED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT OBTAINED FROM 
THE "SEARCH." 
Even if the "search" was unreasonable, the field sobriety tests 
and Burton's arrest were admissible because they were not obtained 
because of the "search." The exclusionary rule only prohibits 
evidence obtained through exploitation of an illegal search. The 
field sobriety tests and the arrest were not obtained by the 
"search." The trial judge found that Officer Schmidt had a 
reasonable articulable suspicion prior to inserting his head into 
the vehicle, so the officer was justified in requiring the sobriety 
tests. Furthermore, Burton voluntarily admitted that he was drunk. 
In short, the "search" yielded no new evidence, so there is no 
evidence to suppress. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE OFFICER DID NOT CONDUCT AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH, 
BECAUSE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ALLOWS INVESTIGATION 
TO QUICKLY CONFIRM OR DISPEL REASONABLE ARTICULABLE 
SUSPICIONS OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 
The officer did not conduct an unreasonable search because his 
reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was intoxicated 
justified further means of investigation. The Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and 
seizures." U.S. CONST, amend. IV. However, the Constitution only 
prohibits unreasonable searches, not all searches. State v. Lopez
 f 
873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 
(1968) . Since Schmidt's alleged search was reasonable under the 
circumstances, it does not offend the Fourth Amendment. 
The "search" was reasonable because Schmidt was justified both 
in stopping Burton and detaining him. "To determine whether a 
search or seizure is constitutionally reasonable, we make a dual 
inquiry: (1) Was the police officer's action "justified at its 
inception'? and (2) Was the resulting detention "reasonably related 
in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in 
the first place'?" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32 {quoting Terry, 392 
U.S. at 19-20) . As to the first inquiry, there is no question that 
the stop was legitimate. The officer testified that he initially 
stopped Burton because he was driving late at night with no 
headlights. (Transcript at 8) . Burton eventually pled guilty to 
that offense. (Transcript at 39). Thus, the stop was legitimate, 
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and the officer's action was justified at its inception.2 
The detention was reasonable because the officer had 
articulable suspicions that Burton was drunk. A routine traffic 
stop is ordinarily limited to "the circumstances which rendered its 
initiation permissible." Lopez, 873 P. 2d at 1132/ see also Terry, 
392 U.S. at 19-20; State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 
1990) (other citations omitted) . However, the limits of such a stop 
expand when an officer has reasonable articulable suspicions that 
a more serious crime has been committed. "Investigative questioning 
that further detains the driver must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion 
means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the 
totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the 
stop." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (citations omitted). 
The trial judge concluded that the officer had a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that Burton was intoxicated, because, as the 
officer obtained the necessary information pursuant to the stop, he 
detected the odor of alcohol. Significantly, the judge held that 
Schmidt detected the odor prior to inserting a portion of his head 
into the vehicle. (Transcript at 32, 34). On the videotape of the 
stop, Burton voluntarily admitted that he was drunk. Therefore, 
the officer was justified in further investigation to determine the 
2
 "[A] police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping 
a vehicle if the stop is incident to a traffic violation committed 
in the officer's presence." Lopez 873 P. 2d at 1132; See also 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); State v. Talbot, 792 
P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1990). 
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extent of Burton's intoxication. 
The officer's investigation was reasonable, because it quickly 
confirmed the suspicion that Burton had been drinking heavily. "If 
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity does arise, 
the scope of the stop is still limited. The officers must 
""diligently [pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to 
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly . . . .'" Lopez, 873 
P.2d at 1132; quoting State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah 
App. 1991); see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 
(1985) . 
The officer quickly confirmed his suspicion that the alcohol 
odor emanated from Burton by moving his head closer to Burton, and 
smelling the air around him. In so doing, a small portion of the 
officer's head may have briefly entered the vehicle's window. This 
action was not a search, but the officer's diligent pursuit of a 
legitimate investigation that would confirm or dispel his 
suspicions quickly. Because it quickly confirmed the suspicion 
that Burton was drunk, the action was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Furthermore, the "search" was within the scope of the permitted 
investigation. As has been stated, the trial judge concluded that 
Officer Schmidt detected the odor of alcohol prior to inserting a 
portion of his head into the vehicle. (Transcript at 32). The 
presence of the odor was a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
Burton was drunk. (Transcript at 34) . Burton also volunteered 
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that he was drunk. Because of that suspicion, the officer could 
have ordered Burton out of the vehicle, performed sobriety tests, 
or obtained breath and blood samples. The officer could also bring 
his head closer to Burton to confirm the extent of the odor, and to 
determine if sobriety tests were appropriate. The "search" was 
therefore reasonable, because it was within the scope of the 
investigation that the officer could have conducted. 
To conclude, Officer Schmidt did not conduct an unreasonable 
"search" by slightly inserting a portion of his head into Burton's 
vehicle. The trial judge found that Schmidt had a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that Burton was drunk prior to inserting any 
part of his head into the vehicle. Furthermore, Burton voluntarily 
admitted that he was drunk. The officer was allowed to investigate 
further, provided the investigation was diligent and quickly 
confirmed or dispelled the suspicion. The officer quickly 
confirmed that Burton had been drinking heavily by smelling 
Burton's breath. Since this was within the allowable scope of the 
officer's investigation, and quickly confirmed his suspicion, the 
"search" was reasonable, and the Fourth Amendment was not violated. 
The evidence should therefore have been admitted. 
II. EVEN IF THE "SEARCH" WAS UNREASONABLE THE OFFICER 
HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONDUCT SOBRIETY TESTS AND 
ARREST BURTON WITHOUT THE INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM 
THE "SEARCH." 
Even if the "search" was unreasonable, the officer still had 
probable cause to conduct field sobriety tests and arrest Burton. 
"[Ejvidence which would be subject to the exclusionary rule may be 
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admissible if the police had an "independent source' for discovery 
of the evidence." State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1293 (Utah 
App. 1988); see also Segura v. United States. 468 U.S. 796, 799 
(1984) . Since the officer had probable cause independent of any 
"search" he may have conducted by inserting his head into the 
vehicle, the field sobriety tests and Burton's arrest are 
admissible. 
As has been stated, the trial judge found that Schmidt 
detected the odor of alcohol from Burton before he inserted his 
head and supposedly "searched" the vehicle by smelling the air near 
Burton's mouth. (Transcript at 32-33). The trial judge 
specifically stated that the presence of the odor outside of the 
vehicle constituted a reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton 
was drunk. (Transcript at 34). Thus, before any alleged "search," 
the officer had a reasonable suspicion that Burton was drunk, and 
could have required field sobriety tests. (Transcript at 33). 
As shown on the videotape, Burton voluntarily admitted that he 
was drunk. Thus, before the officer inserted his nose or any other 
portion of his body into the vehicle, Burton stated that he was 
drunk. This alone gave the officer probable cause to arrest 
Burton. In other words, even if the "search" was unreasonable, 
Burton's voluntary admission, which did not derive from the alleged 
"search," was more than enough probable cause for the officer to 
conduct sobriety tests and arrest Burton. Because the tests and 
the arrest are justified from evidence independent of any 
unreasonable "search," they are therefore admissible under the 
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independent source doctrine.3 
In conclusion, the field sobriety tests and Burton's arrest 
did not derive from the alleged "search" of Burton's vehicle. The 
officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton had been 
drinking prior to inserting any part of his head into the vehicle. 
Furthermore, Burton voluntarily admitted that he was drunk. This 
information was obtained independent of the alleged "search," and 
is thus admissible. Suppression of evidence should not "put the 
government in a worse position, because the police would have 
obtained the evidence if no misconduct had taken place." Northrup, 
756 P.2d at 1294; see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 
(1984) . 
III. EVEN IF THE "SEARCH" WAS UNREASONABLE UNDER THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT, THE EVIDENCE OF THE FIELD 
SOBRIETY TESTS AND BURTON'S ARREST SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN SUPPRESSED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT OBTAINED FROM 
THE "SEARCH." 
Even if the alleged "search" was unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, the evidence of the field sobriety tests and Burton's 
arrest should not have been suppressed because it was not obtained 
from the "search." The exclusionary rule only suppresses "evidence 
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution. 
3
 The trial judge rejected the argument that the officer's 
reasonable suspicion was obtained independent of any alleged 
"search," and thus the field sobriety tests were justified. At the 
hearing, the City prosecutor argued that the evidence was 
admissible under the inevitable discovery rule. The argument made 
is more correctly the independent source doctrine. (Transcript at 
35-37) . 
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. . ." Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).4 Thus, the 
exclusionary rule requires the suppression of only the evidence 
obtained because the officer inserted his head into Burton's 
vehicle. 
The trial judge found that the officer detected the odor of 
alcohol before he inserted his head into Burton's vehicle. 
Therefore, the officer formed a reasonable articulable suspicion 
that Burton was drunk without any questionable search. In 
addition, Burton voluntarily admitted he was drunk. In short, the 
officer obtained no new evidence by inserting his head into 
Burton's vehicle. At most, the action merely confirmed what 
Schmidt had already discovered. Since the "search" yielded no new 
evidence, there is no evidence to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial judge improperly granted Burton's motion to 
suppress, because there was no unreasonable search of Burton's 
vehicle. The arresting officer stopped Burton for operating a 
vehicle at night without headlights. The trial judge found that 
the officer detected the odor of alcohol prior to inserting his 
head into the vehicle to confirm that Burton had alcohol on his 
breath. The officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
Burton was drunk, which allowed the officer to pursue a means of 
4
 See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 
(1963) (stating that evidence is excluded only if it was obtained 
"by exploitation of [the] illegality . . . ." Id.) . 
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investigation that would quickly confirm or dispel the suspicion. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32. 
The officer quickly confirmed that Burton had been drinking 
heavily by smelling the air near him. This was within the scope of 
his investigation, because the officer could have requested that 
Burton exit the vehicle and perform sobriety tests, or required 
breath and blood samples. Since the investigation was within the 
officer's permitted authority, and since it quickly confirmed the 
suspicion that Burton was drunk, the "search" was reasonable and did 
not offend the Fourth Amendment. 
Furthermore, even if the alleged "search" was unreasonable, the 
field sobriety tests and arrest of Burton are admissible. The 
officer could have required the sobriety tests and arrested Burton 
based on the odor of alcohol and Burton's voluntary admission that 
he was drunk. The officer obtained that information before 
inserting a portion of his head into the vehicle. Since the 
officer had probable cause to require the tests and make the arrest 
independent of any information obtained from inserting his head 
into Burton's vehicle, the evidence was admissible. Northrup, 756 
P.2d at 1293. 
Finally, the only evidence that should have been suppressed 
was that obtained by the officer from inserting his head into the 
vehicle. As has been stated, the trial judge held that the officer 
had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was drunk before 
the officer inserted his head into the vehicle. In addition, 
Burton voluntarily admitted he was drunk. This evidence was not 
13 
obtained because the officer inserted his head into the vehicle, 
and was more than enough probable cause for the officer to require 
sobriety tests and arrest Burton. The officer obtained no new 
evidence from inserting his head into the vehicle, so no evidence 
should be suppressed because of it. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655; Wong 
Sun, 371 U.S. at 444. 
For these reasons, the trial judge incorrectly concluded that 
the evidence of the field sobriety tests and Burton's arrest should 
be suppressed. West Valley City respectfully asks that the Court 
reverse the trial judge's decision and remand the case for 
prosecution. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of November, 1996. 
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